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INSURANCE
I. IMPLIED CONSENT
Omnibus clauses in insurance contracts have been a major
source of litigation,' and many of the disputes have involved the
issue of "permission, express or implied." 2 This issue is primarily
"fact-oriented rather than law-oriented." 3 Quite frequently the
question of permission relates "to whether a person who was using
the car at the time of the accident had been allowed by the named
insured to use it only for a limited time or limited purpose."4
It is not uncommon for a named insured to give permission
to use his car to another, who in turn gives permission to a third
person to use the named insured's car.5 In Keeler v. Allstate In-
surance Co. ,' the plaintiff-appellant instituted a suit against All-
state Insurance Company to recover for personal injuries and
property damage suffered in an automobile collision. The acci-
dent occurred when the automobile which Keeler was driving
collided with an automobile being driven by Troy Taylor. Taylor,
a minor, was driving the vehicle with the express permission of
Raymond Williams also a minor, who had recently purchased it.
Prior to purchasing the car, Raymond had discussed with his
parents the possibility of including it on his father's Allstate in-
surance policy. An Allstate agent told Raymond's mother the
automobile could be added to the existing policy if the title were
placed in his father's name. Accordingly, after purchasing the
automobile, Raymond registered and titled it in his father's
name. Raymond made all the payments for the automobile and
paid his portion of the insurance coverage.'
Raymond was given general and unrestricted permission for
his personal use of the vehicle, but he was expressly prohibited
by his father from allowing other persons to drive it. Mr. Williams
specifically instructed his son that Troy Taylor was not to drive
the automobile.
1. R. KEarON, INSURANCE LAW § 4.7(b) (1971).
2. Id. at 223.
3. Id. at 225.
4. Id. at 223.
5. Id. at 226.
6. 261 S.C. 151, 198 S.E.2d 793 (1973). The court filed a three to two decision in which
Justice Brailsford concurred in the results and filed an opinion. Justice Lewis dissented
and also filed an opinion in which Justice Bussey concurred.
7. These facts were stipulated by the parties to the lower court and are from Ms.
Williams' testimonial affidavit and addendum introduced at the trial.
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On the date of the collision, Raymond wanted to "try out"
Troy's new car. At Raymond's suggestion the two exchanged au-
tomobiles for a few hours. Thus, at the time of the accident,
Taylor was operating Raymond's automobile with his express
permission.
Keeler brought suit against Taylor and was awarded $12,000
in damages. Allstate, however, refused to defend the action on the
ground that Taylor was not a permissive user of the automobile
within the terms of the policy. Subsequently, Keeler brought the
present action against Allstate to recover $10,000 under Allstate's
bodily injury provision and $500 under the property damage cov-
erage.'
The trial judge, sitting without a jury, concluded that the
"actual use" of the automobile at the time of the collision was
without the permission of the named insured (the father) and
that Taylor's use of the vehicle violated the specific prohibition
by the named insured. The trial judge further found that Taylor's
use of the automobile did not serve a purpose of or benefit either
the named insured or Raymond, the original permittee5
The supreme court, by a three to two vote, affirmed the lower
court holding. Regarding the issue of whether Taylor was using
the car with permission of the named insured, the court affirmed
the trial court's finding of no permission, and hence no coverage
under the insurance policy."
The court stated:
The permission which puts the omnibus or extended coverage
clause of the policy of liability insurance into operation may be
either express or implied, but whether the permission be ex-
pressly granted or impliedly conferred, it must originate in the
language or the conduct of the named insured or of someone
having authority to bind him in that respect."
8. 261 S.C. at 154, 198 S.E.2d at 794.
9. Id. at 154, 198 S.E.2d at 795.
10. Id. Section 1 of the Allstate insurance policy defined insured as "... (3) any
other person with respect to the owned automobile, provided the actual use thereof is with
the permission of the named insured." (Emphasis added).
The South Carolina statute extends omnibus coverage to "any person who uses [the
insured vehicle] with the consent, expressed or implied, of the named insured .
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31(2) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
11. 261 S.C. at 155, 198 S.E.2d at 795. See also Rakestraw v. Allstate Ins. Co., 238
S.C. 217, 119 S.E.2d 746 (1961); Government Employment Ins. Co. v. White, 260 S.C. 163,
194 S.E.2d 884 (1973).
1974]
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Furthermore, the court asserted that:
Implied consent . . . rests upon proof of circumstances from
which an inference of actual permission or consent reasonably
arises. The implication is one of fact based upon circumstantial
evidence. Implied consent involves an inference arising from a
course of conduct or relationship between the parties, in which
there is mutual acquiescence or lack of objection under circum-
stances signifying assent.'2
The court determined that the trial judge had reached a
conclusion "of which the facts are susceptible;" 3 it thus consid-
ered itself bound by his findings of fact. Because the case was
tried by the judge without a jury, his findings of fact had the same
force and effect of a jury verdict.4 The court considered its rulings
in three previous cases'5 to be dispositive of the issue of implied
consent.
The court also affirmed the trial court's determination that
Raymond Williams, even though the "real owner," did not oc-
cupy the equivalent position of the named insured under the
Allstate liability insurance policy.'6 Quoting from State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 7 the
court said that "omnibus coverage in this case depends upon the
consent, not of the owner but of the named insured. . . ."' The
plaintiff-appellant, in his brief, had attempted to persuade the
court to elevate the son to the equivalent of the named insured
in accord with principles of reformation of a contract. The conten-
tion was that Allstate, through its agent, had knowledge of the
true circumstances of the ownership, possession and use of the
automobile by Raymond. Various jurisdictions have held the
12. 261 S.C. at 155, 198 S.E.2d at 795. See also Crenshaw v. Harleysville Mut. Cas.
Co., 246 S.C. 549, 554, 144 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1965); Government Employment Ins. Co. v.
White, 260 S.C. 163, 169, 194 S.E.2d 884, 887 (1973).
13. 261 S.C. at 156, 198 S.E.2d at 795.
14. Id.
15. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 392, 179 S.E.2d 203
(1971); Dearybury v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 398, 179 S.E.2d 206 (1971); and
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 255 S.C. 427,
179 S.E.2d 454 (1971). However, in his concurring opinion in Keeler, Justice Brailsford
stated these cases were not controlling, and thus agreed with Justices Lewis and Bussey
on this point. Nevertheless, Justice Brailsford concurred in the result of the court based
on the findings of fact of the trial judge. It appears that the dissent correctly interpreted
these cases.
16. 261 S.C. at 157, 198 S.E.2d at 796.
17. 255 S.C. 392, 179 S.E.2d 203 (1971).
18. Id. at 397, 179 S.E.2d at 205.
[Vol. 26250
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"real owner" to be the named insured by applying principles of
estoppel, waiver, oral contract, or reformation. 9 In the present
case, it appears significant that no evidence was presented to
indicate that Allstate knew Raymond was paying his share of the
insurance premium. The record does not reveal whether Ray-
mond paid his portion of the premium directly to the insurance
company or whether he paid his father who then forwarded only
a single payment to Allstate. Justice Lewis, in his dissenting
opinion in which Justice Bussey concurred, appears to have cor-
rectly interpreted State Farm as not controlling.0 His assertion
was that the court in State Farm had recognized a distinction
between the extent of the omnibus coverage under South Caro-
lina law and the coverage which might be provided under policy
provisions similar to the one involved in this case. 2' In State Farm
omnibus coverage was determined by the South Carolina stat-
ute22 which provided coverage to "any person who uses [the vehi-
cle] with the consent, express or implied, of the named insured
..... Although the court was primarily concerned with the sta-
tutory language in State Farm, it noted that other jurisdictions
have dealt with the question of omnibus coverage where the
policy language was similar, if not identical, to that in Keeler.
23
Most courts have interpreted the language in such policies to
provide broader coverage than the statutory language. In such
cases, even in the face of a violation of the named insured's prohi-
bition, courts have extended omnibus coverage to third persons
by distinguishing between "use" and "operate" to find that at the
time of the accident, the vehicle was employed for a permitted
purpose or "use" .24 The distinction made by the courts is that the
use or actual use must be permitted and the question of whether
the person who is using the vehicle has been given permission is
unimportant. 5 In Keeler it was undisputed that, "at the time of
this accident the automobile was being used for its intended pur-
19. Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co. v. Rose, 62 Wash. 2d 896, 385 P.2d 45 (1963);
Doyle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 4 Wis. 2d 411, 90 N.W.2d 562 (1958); Traders & General Ins.
Co. v. Lucas, 281 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
20. 261 S.C. at 160, 198 S.E.2d at 798.
21. 255 S.C. at 395-97, 179 S.E.2d at 204-05.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
23. See note 10 supra for the policy language in Keeler which employs the term
"actual use."
24. Id.
25. 261 S.C. at 161, 198 S.E.2d at 798.
1974]
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pose."2 Therefore, Justice Lewis concluded that the insurance
policy afforded coverage to Taylor because the actual use of the
automobile had been permitted by the named insured. "[The
fact that the named insured may have instructed his son not to
allow a third party to drive . . . is irrelevant, since such
prohibition refers to the operation of the vehicle and not the
purpose for which the use is permitted."
In Government Employment Insurance Co. v. White, 2 the
court also considered the issue of implied consent. A declaratory
judgment action was instituted to resolve a dispute over liability
between two insurance companies. Wright, a teenage boy, had
left his father's car at Glover's service station to be serviced. He
later returned to the station accompanied by Jeffords, who was
fourteen years old, unlicensed and could not drive an automobile.
While Wright, Jeffords, and the owner of the station, Mr. Glover,
were waiting in the office portion of the station, an employee,
White, serviced the automobile. White went to the door of the
office area and asked one of the three to start the car so he could
check the oil filter. Jeffords, apparently in response to White's
request, walked past Wright and Glover into the service area.
When Jeffords attempted to start the car, it was in gear and
lunged forward, pinning White to the wall and injuring him.
The supreme court concluded that when Wright surrendered
the automobile to Glover, the custody and control of the vehicle
also passed to Glover. The court found that Glover granted full
permission to White to service the vehicle, including the right to
operate or use it as necessary in servicing. White was, therefore,
acting within the scope of employment and within the permission
granted by Glover." When White, the original permittee, allowed
26. Id. at 162, 198 S.E.2d at 799. See also 7 AM. JuR. 2d Automobile Insurance § 117
(1963). The rule that a permittee may not allow a third party to "use" the named insured's
automobile has generally been held not to preclude recovery under an omnibus clause
where: (1) the original permittee is riding in the automobile with the second permittee at
the time of the accident; or (2) if the second permittee, in using the vehicle, is serving
some purpose of the original permittee.
27. 261 S.C. at 161-62, 198 S.E.2d at 798. This distinction is fully discussed in Annot.,
4 A.L.R.3d 10, 66-75 (1965). South Carolina is considered to follow the strict construction
rule involving disputes over "permission" under omnibus clauses. Eagle Fire Co. of N.Y.
v. Mullins, 238 S.C. 272, 280, 120 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1961); Rakestraw v. Allstate Ins. Co., 238
S.C. 217, 227, 119 S.E.2d 746, 751 (1961). For a discussion of the distinctive lines of
authority which have developed concerning this issue, see R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW
§ 4.7(b) (1971).
28. 260 S.C. 163, 194 S.E.2d 884 (1973). This case was cited in Keeler as defining
implied consent.
29. Id. at 169, 194 S.E.2d at 887.
[Vol. 26
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Jeffords to start the automobile, Jeffords became the second per-
mittee and was acting for the benefit of White and Glover. 3 The
court held that Jeffords had the express permission of White and
the implied permission of Glover to operate or use the automo-
bile. Since Jefford's use of the automobile was within the scope
of the original permission granted to White by Glover, Jeffords
therefore, was an insured under the omnibus clause of the garage
liability policy issued to Glover .
3
Obviously Keeler is distinguishable because an express pro-
hibition had been given to the original permittee not to allow
Taylor to drive the vehicle. No such prohibition was present in
White. In addition, implied consent was more clearly inferable in
White because the named insured, Glover, was in the office area
with Jeffords when White requested assistance.
The garage insurer also contended that its policy did not
apply "to bodily injury to an employee of the insured arising out
of and in the course of his employment by the insured .... -32
The court held that the exclusionary clause was inapplicable be-
cause the "insured" under this provision referred to Jeffords, and
White was an employee of Glover, not of Jeffords.
3
The court also considered the issue of implied consent in
Allstate Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co. 4 An action was instituted seeking a declaratory judg-
ment to determine the liability of the insurance companies. In the
lower court, a jury determined that Mitchell K. Robertson, Jr.,
was operating an automobile with the consent of its owner, Linda
H. Robertson, his estranged wife.3" On appeal the South Carolina
Supreme Court considered only one basic issue-whether the evi-
dence, as a whole, was susceptible of the inference that Mitchell
was driving his wife's automobile with her consent, express or
implied, when it collided with another vehicle.38
The Robertsons were separated in 1971, but it appears that
"[t]he relationship between the estranged couple remained
30. Id.
31. Id. at 170, 194 S.E.2d at 887, citing with approval Strickland v. Georgia Cas. &
Surety Co., 224 Ga. 487, 162 S.E.2d 421 (1968).
32. Id. at 168, 194 S.E.2d at 886.
33. Id. at 170, 194 S.E.2d at 887, citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Employers'
Fire Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 91, 123 S.E.2d 108 (1961).
34. 260 S.C. 350, 195 S.E.2d 711 (1973).
35. Id. at 351, 195 S.E.2d at 712.
36. Id. at 352, 195 S.E.2d at 712.
1974]
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friendly, if not cordial."37 On a Saturday morning in September,
1971, Mitchell picked up his wife's automobile to repair it for her
without charge, leaving his personal car for her use. She ex-
plained that she was planning to drive to North Carolina that
afternoon and would need her automobile at 4 or 4:30 p.m. How-
ever, Mitchell apparently did not begin working on the automo-
bile until 3- or 4:00 p.m. Linda attempted to contact Mitchell
when she was ready to leave but, unable to reach him, she de-
cided to travel with a friend. She left a note on his car requesting
that he leave her automobile, as well as $10.00 to pay for the
repair. At approximately 10:30 p.m. that evening, while Mitchell
was driving his wife's automobile he was killed in a collision with
another vehicle.
The supreme court determined that the permissive use of the
automobile did not expire at 4:30 p.m. when Mitchell failed to
return the car to Linda's apartment. To the contrary, the court
concluded that the evidence was susceptible of the inference that
Linda and Mitchell had at least impliedly agreed that each would
use the car of the other until the exchange was made .3 The court
stated that implied permission to use an automobile may be es-
tablished from:
(1) the direct evidence, drawing all pertinent circumstances
and proper inferences therefrom;
(2) the general relationship of the parties (possibly the para-
mount consideration);
(3) a course of conduct or relationship in which mutual ac-
quiescence or a lack of objection might signify assent.39 The court
held that a reasonable inference of consent could be found in the
relationship of mutual trust between Linda and Mitchell. The
lower court, therefore, had correctly submitted the issue of con-
sent to the jury.
40
I. UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
A. Physical Contact Requirement
In Louthian v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,' a passen-
37. Id.
38. Id. at 354, 195 S.E.2d at 713.
39. Id. See also Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hartford A. & I. Co., 255 S.C.
427, 179 S.E.2d 454 (1971); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. American Ins. Co., 251 S.C.
56, 159 S.E.2d 921 (1968); and Crenshaw v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 246 S.C. 549, 144
S.E.2d 810 (1965).
40. 260 S.C. at 354, 195 S.E.2d at 713.
41. 357 F. Supp. 894 (D.S.C. 1973). The district court granted plaintiff's motion for
[Vol. 26
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ger in an insured vehicle brought an action against the host's
automobile insurer seeking to recover, under uninsured motorist
coverage, a judgment obtained against an unidentified owner or
operator of a hit-and-run vehicle. The hit-and-run vehicle col-
lided with an intervening vehicle causing that vehicle to strike the
host's automobile. Although there was no physical contact
between the unidentified vehicle and the one in which the plain-
tiff was a passenger, it was uncontested that the intervening vehi-
cle first collided with the unidentified vehicle before striking the
passenger-plaintiffs vehicle.2
The district court held that the physical contact requirement
of the South Carolina statute43 and of the insurance policy was
satisfied by physical contact between the hit-and-run vehicle and
the intervening vehicle which ultimately collided with the plain-
tiff's automobile. The court determined that the South Carolina
Supreme Court had not specifically ruled on this aspect of the
issue of physical contact.4 The district court therefore relied upon
cases from other jurisdictions in deciding the issue in favor of the
plaintiff-passenger. 5 This holding appears to be consistent with
summary judgment in part by holding that even though the case involved interpretation
of a South Carolina statute, and state law was unclear, abstention was improper where
no constitutional issue was involved. See also Survey of Practice and Procedure infra.
42. 357 F. Supp. at 896.
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.34 (Cum. Supp. 1973), which reads in part:
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily injury or
property damage to the insured be unknown, there shall be no right of action or
recovery under the uninsured motorist provision, unless . . . (2) the injury or
damage was caused by physical contact with the unknown vehicle ....
44. However, a similar question was considered by the supreme court in Coker v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 251 S.C. 175, 161 S.E.2d 175 (1968). In Coker the plaintiff's automo-
bile collided with a second vehicle, whose driver was identified. The second vehicle had
been racing with a third vehicle, whose driver was unknown. There was no physical
contact between the unknown vehicle and either the second vehicle or with plaintiff's
vehicle. The court held that in view of the statute, the absence of any such physical
contact was fatal to plaintiffs claim. But the court specifically left open the fact situation
now present in Louthian:
Cases have been cited where the vehicle driven by the unknown motorist struck
another vehicle and knocked it into the vehicle of the insured . . . . Whether
or not such would satisfy the physical contact provisions of our statute is not
involved in this case. Here there was no contact between the unknown vehicle
and any other vehicle involved in the collision. 251 S.C. at 182, 161 S.E.2d at
178-79.
See also Wynn v. Doe, 255 S.C. 509, 180 S.E.2d 95 (1971).
45. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Spinola, 374 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1967), citing
with approval the following cases: Inter-Insurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of
Southern Cal. v. Lopez, 238 Cal. App. 2d 441, 47 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1965); Motor Vehicle
Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Eisenberg, 18 N.Y.2d 1, 218 N.E.2d 524 (1966). The
court was also persuaded by the implications contained in Coker, 251 S.C. at 182, 161
S.E.2d at 178. 8
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the generally accepted view.46 Since the purpose of the physical
contact requirement of the South Carolina uninsured motorist
statute47 is to prevent or eliminate fraud by parties creating
"phantom" hit-and-run accidents, the district court's decision is
sound."
B. Amount of Insurer's Liability
The case of Ferguson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co.49 presented an issue of first impression in this state.
An action for recovery under the uninsured motorist clause was
brought by the executrix of a deceased insured motorist's estate
against the deceased's insurer. The deceased, while driving his
own automobile in the course and scope of his employment, was
fatally injured in a collision with an automobile driven by an
uninsured motorist. The decedent's statutory dependents re-
covered under workmen's compensation law. The insurer denied
recovery, alleging that a limiting clause in the policy allowed
sums received under workmen's compensation claims to be sub-
tracted from the amount recoverable under the uninsured motor-
ist clause.
The court held that any exclusionary language in an insur-
ance contract which has the effect of providing less protection
than that required by the uninsured motorist statute" is contrary
to public policy and thus is of no force and effect. The court
adopted the generally accepted rule' and concluded that:
[the insurer's] liability under the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment is contractual in nature and arises after the liability of the
uninsured motorist has been established and is not subject to
reduction by the amounts received . . . under the Workmen's
Compensation Law for the reason that such provision places a
46. Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1299 (1969).
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.34 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
48. See Coker v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 251 S.C. at 181, 161 S.E.2d at 177-78. This
same issue of physical contact, involving the driver of plaintiff-passenger's vehicle in
Louthian was recently decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Spaulding v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 202 S.E.2d 653 (S.C. 1974). The court's decision agreed
with the holding in Louthian.
49. 261 S.C. 96, 198 S.E.2d 522 (1973).
50. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.32 and 750.33 (Cum. Supp. 1973), obligates the insurer
". to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover. . . from
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle . .. ."
51. 261 S.C. at 101, 198 S.E.2d at 525. For the general rule, see Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d
873 (1969).
[Vol. 26
9
Weeks: Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons,
INSURANCE
limitation upon the requirement of the statute and conflicts
with the terms thereof.
52
The court stated that the purpose of the uninsured motorist
statutes was to provide benefits and protection against injury or
death caused by an uninsured motorist to an insured motorist, his
family and the permissive users of his vehicle. 3 "The uninsured
motorist endorsement is the contract which the insurance com-
pany makes with the insured to protect him against the
uninsured motorist."54 Since the insurance contract between
State Farm and Ferguson was controlled by and subject to the
Uninsured Motorist Act, any inconsistent policy provisions would
be void, and the pertinent provisions of the act would prevail just
as if they were expressly incorporated in the policy.
In Boyd v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,"
the South Carolina Supreme Court considered an issue very simi-
lar to that in Ferguson. Boyd involved the question of whether
"other insurance" provisions in insurance policies designed to
limit the liability of the insurer to $5,000 on each policy issued
to the same insured are invalid as being in derogation of the
uninsured motorist statute.57 The lower court held the limiting
provisions invalid because the uninsured motorist statute re-
quires that each policy afford a minimum of $10,000 protection
for personal injury to one person."
In Boyd the plaintiff-respondent was injured by a hit-and-
run motorist while walking home from school. Plaintiffs father,
with whom he resided, was the named insured in two automobile
liability insurance policies issued by State Farm. The plaintiff
was awarded a $33,000 judgment in a "John Doe" action pur-
suant to the uninsured motorist statute, but State Farm paid the
52. 261 S.C. at 102-03, 198 S.E.2d at 525.
53. Id. at 100, 198 S.E.2d at 524. See Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134
S.E.2d 206 (1964).
54. 261 S.C. at 100, 198 S.E.2d at 524.
55. Id. at 101, 198 S.E.2d at 524.
56. 260 S.C. 316, 195 S.E.2d 706 (1973).
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.32 (Cum. Supp. 1973) prescribes minimum limits for
automobile liability insurance policies of $10,000 for injury to or death of one person.
Section 46-750.33, Cumulative Supplement, provides that:
[n]o such [automobile liability] policy or contract shall be issued ...unless
it contains . . . the uninsured motorist provision, undertaking to pay the in-
sured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, within limits which shall be
no less than the requirements of Section 46-750.32.
58. 260 S.C. at 319, 195 S.E.2d at 707.
1974]
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss2/8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
plaintiff only $10,000, claiming that this amount exhausted the
coverage under the two policies. Plaintiff then brought this action
seeking a declaration that State Farm owed him an additional
$10,000.
Affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court noted
the settled rule that statutory provisions relating to an insur-
ance contract are considered part of the contract and that, when
a policy provision contravenes such a statute it is to that extent
invalid." The court reasoned that the statute's prohibition
against the issuance of any liability policy without the prescribed
minimum coverage is equivalent to a requirement that each pol-
icy issued shall provide this coverage. Thus, the position taken
by State Farm would have effectively reduced the stdtutory mini-
mum by one-half.6" The statute obligated the insurer "to pay
plaintiff all sums which he is legally entitled to recover from the
tortfeasor up to the limit of insurance provided by both policies.
Since plaintiff's damages exceeded the sum of available cover-
ages, the 'other insurance' provisions were ineffective." 6'
The court recognized the split of authority in other jurisdic-
tions on this issue;"2 but, since it found no ambiguity in the unin-
sured motorist statute, the statute was considered controlling. "If
the legislature did not intend the result dictated by the language
of the statute, the remedy is by amendment. It does not lie with
US.'
63
C. The "Insured" Under The Uninsured Motorist Statute
In Hogan v. Home Insurance Co. 64 a suit was brought against
59. Id.
60. Id. at 320, 195 S.E.2d at 707. Even though this precise point had not been pre-
viously decided by the court, the result reached was foreshadowed by Whitmire v. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co., 254 S.C. 184, 174 S.E.2d 391 (1970), and Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 258 S.C. 533, 189 S.E.2d 823 (1972). Whitmire recognized the
validity of "other insurance" clauses when applied for the purpose of determining the
liability of insurance companies between themselves, but not for the purpose of affording
less coverage than required by the uninsured motorist statute. 254 S.C. at 194-95, 174
S.E.2d at 396.
61. 260 S.C. at 321, 195 S.E.2d at 708.
62. Id. See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969).
63. 260 S.C. at 321, 195 S.E.2d at 708. Where statutory language is clear and unambi-
guous, the court may not look to the legislative history of the act for aid in interpretation
or construction. The words are given their plain, ordinary meaning and the act must be
enforced as written.
In a companion case, Moore v. Maryland Casualty Co., 260 S.C. 244, 195 S.E.2d 392
(1973), the court in a per curiam decision applied Boyd as controlling.
64. 260 S.C. 157, 194 S.E.2d 890 (1973).
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an insurer to recover under the uninsured motorist coverage. The
South Carolina Supreme Court considered the validity of a provi-
sion in the automobile liability insurance policy which excluded
resident relatives of the named insured from the uninsured mo-
torist coverage except when occupying the vehicle described in
the policy. In affirming the lower court decision, the court con-
cluded that the provision constituted an invalid limitation upon
the broad coverage required by statute" and was therefore void.
In Hogan the insurer issued to Lila S. Hogan, the named
insured, an automobile liability policy which included the re-
quired uninsured motorist endorsement. The vehicle described
in the policy was a 1962 Ford. Residing in the household of the
named insured were her son and a nephew. The boys, both mi-
nors, were killed in a single-car accident while riding in an unin-
sured automobile that was titled in the name of Lila S. Hogan,
but was actually owned by her nephew. He had purchased the car
and exercised exclusive control over it."
As a result of an action for the wrongful death of the son, a
judgment was entered against the estate of the nephew. The ad-
ministrator of the son's estate subsequently sued to recover the
judgment from Home Insurance Company under the uninsured
motorist provisions of the policy issued to Ms. Hogan. The as-
serted liability of the insurer was based upon the statutory re-
quirement that the policy provide uninsured motorist protection
to the son as a resident member of her household. Home Insur-
ance denied liability, relying upon an exclusionary clause in the
uninsured motorist endorsement of the policy."
In its opinion, the court noted the established policy that, if
a clause in an insurance contract is in conflict with the statutorily
required provisions governing uninsured motorist coverage, the
statute controls the rights of the parties. 8 According to the court,
the term "insured" in the uninsured motorist statutes,69 refers to
two classes of insureds, each of which receives different coverage:
65. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.31(2), -750.33 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
66. 260 S.C. at 159, 194 S.E.2d at 890-91.
67. The exclusionary clause provided: "This endorsement (the uninsured motorist
endorsement) does not apply: . . . (b) to bodily injury to an uninsured while occupying
an automobile (other than an insured automobile) owned by the named insured or any
relative resident in the same household." 260 S.C. at 160, 194 S.E.2d at 891.
68. 260 S.C. at 160, 194 S.E.2d at 891. See also Ferguson v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 261 S.C. at 101, 198 S.E.2d at 524; and Boyd v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
260 S.C. at 319, 195 S.E.2d at 707.
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31(2) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
19741
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(1) The named insured, his spouse and his or her relatives resi-
dent in the same household, 'while in a motor vehicle or other-
wise' and
(2) any permissive user or guest when occupying the insured
motor vehicle. The members of the first class are covered at all
times without reference to the use of the insured vehicle; while
the members of the second are covered only while using, or a
guest in, '[the] motor vehicle to which the policy applies.' 0
The court clearly distinguished the issue under consideration
in Hogan from the issue decided in Willis v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co.7 In Willis the court held that a provision in an automobile
liability policy excluding liability coverage-as distinguished
from uninsured motorist coverage-to an insured while driving an
automobile, which was not described in the policy but was owned
by the named insured or a member of the same household, was a
valid policy provision. The limiting provision did not conflict
with the requirements of the South Carolina Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act.72 The court was required to distinguish
Willis because the Act defines "insured" as applying to both
liability coverage and uninsured motorist coverage.73
The liability contract is only required to insure "the persons
defined as insured, against loss from the liability imposed by
law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of' the motor vehicle described in the policy; while unin-
sured motorist coverage obligates the insurer to pay all sums
which the insured "shall be legally entitled to recover as dam-
ages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle."
Uninsured motorist coverage is not to provide coverage for the
uninsured vehicle but to afford additional protection to an in-
sured. Unlike the provisions relative to liability coverage, the
statute plainly affords uninsured motorist coverage to the
named insured and resident relatives of his or her household at
all times and without regard to the activity in which they were
engaged at the time. Such coverage is nowhere limited in the
statute to the use of the insured vehicle, and cannot be so lim-
ited by the policy provisions.
74
70. 260 S.C. at 161, 194 S.E.2d at 892.
71. 253 S.C. 91, 169 S.E.2d 282 (1969).
72. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.31(2), -750.32 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
73. 260 S.C. at 161, 194 S.E.2d at 892.
74. Id. at 162, 194 S.E.2d at 892. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.33 (Cur. Supp.
1973).
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III. PoLIcY PROVISIONS
A. "Direct and Immediate"
In Lesley v. American Security Insurance Co.,75 the South
Carolina Supreme Court considered an insurance policy which
was issued to provide coverage "against death of poultry, directly
and immediately resulting from . . . fire and lightning . "..."76
A number of insured's chickens died as a result of excessive heat
and suffocation when an electrical storm apparently caused a
power failure. The supreme court, in affirming a trial court
verdict, found adequate evidence from which it could reasonably
be inferred that the power failure resulted from lightning. Suffi-
cient evidence was also found to support the allegation that the
death of the chickens was the "direct and immediate" result of
the lightning within the meaning of the insurance policy.
The main issue presented in the case was whether the terms
"directly and immediately" should have been equated with
"proximate cause".77 The trial judge charged the jury that the
insured was required to prove that lightning was the proximate
cause as well as the direct and immediate factor causing the
death of the chickens. The judge defined proximate cause as fol-
lows:
[P]roximate cause is the efficient cause. [It] means literally
the cause nearest in point of time. But under the law it does not
necessarily mean that. It means here the efficient cause, it is the
direct cause, the cause without which the loss would not have
occurred. So it is your duty to decide what was the proximate
cause of the death of the chickens.
7 8
The supreme court held that this charge was not erroneous. It
asserted the existence of authority in this state which supports
the proposition that the terms proximate and immediate are
virtually synonymous.7 9 The court adopted the generally accepted
rule of insurance law that only the proximate cause of loss, and
not the remote cause, is regarded in determining whether recov-
75. 199 S.E.2d 82 (S.C. 1973).
76. Id. at 84.
77. Id. The insurer also raised the issue of intervening causes, but the court stated
that this issue was not properly before the court.
78. Id. at 84-85.
79. Id. at 85, citing Suber v. Parr Shoals Power Co., 113 S.C. 317, 102 S.E. 335 (1920).
1974]
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ery is allowed, and that the loss must be proximately caused by
a peril insured against."
B. "Temporary Use of Substitute"
In Whittington v. Ranger Insurance Co.,81 the insurer had
issued an insurance policy affording liability coverage with re-
spect to the "temporary use of substitute aircraft" if the aircraft
described in the policy was "withdrawn from normal use because
of its breakdown, servicing, loss or destruction."82 The court was
confronted with the factual question of whether an aircraft was
withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown.
The insured aircraft, a Champion Catabria, was purchased
new in December, 1968. After only six flying hours the engine was
replaced by the manufacturer as defective. Shortly thereafter,
moisture in the voltage regulator necessitated minor additional
repairs. The record revealed no further difficulty with the Cham-
pion until April 16, 1969, when the pilot, Hysell, flew the Cham-
pion from Goat Island, Lake Marion, to the Hampton, South
Carolina airport to pick up a passenger. After picking up his
passenger, Hysell made several unsuccessful attempts to start the
plane; however, he ceased his efforts because he knew the battery
would not last very long. Hysell substituted a Cessna 172 for the
Champion and flew it to Goat Island with his passenger. The
crash occurred on the return trip that evening, fatally injuring his
passenger, Whittington. It was undisputed that had Hysell suc-
ceeded in starting the Champion, it would have been used rather
than the Cessna."3 The Champion apparently was not flown or
used by anyone while the Cessna was being used, "and at least
inferentially, the Champion was not flown again for quite some
80. 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 1182 (1969). This section distinguishes proximate
cause as applied to insurance cases from proximate cause in tort law. The distinction is
made that in tort cases the rules of proximate cause are applied solely to fix culpability,
whereas in insurance law the purpose of proximate cause is to determine only the nature
of the injury and how it happened. In insurance cases, courts look to see if the nearest
efficient cause of the loss is one of the perils insured against. If it is, the court looks no
further. If the nearest efficient cause of the loss is not a peril insured against, recovery
may still be allowed if the dominant cause is a risk or peril insured against. In other words
the proximate cause of an insurance loss may be either the dominant or efficient cause.
But in R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 5.5(b) (1971), the proposition is made that
actually the analogy between insurance and tort cases on issues of proximate cause is quite
close.
81. 201 S.E.2d 620 (S.C. 1973).
82. Id. at 621.
83. Id.
[Vol. 26
15
Weeks: Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons,
INSURANCE
time after. . . April 16th." However, no evidence was presented
to indicate any repairs were subsequently made to the Champion.
There was evidence from which an inference might be made that
nothing was mechanically wrong with the plane, but that Hysell
was unable to start it either because the engine overheated or
"because he thinned out his fuel mixture too much" when land-
ing."' Hysell was a primary user of the Cessna, but was also a
principal user of the Champion."6
The court noted no cases which involved insurance coverage
of a temporary substitute airplane under a similar policy clause.
Therefore, the court relied upon its construction of an identical
clause used in automobile liability policies and held it was a
proper jury function to determine whether the airplane was a
temporary substitute under the policy. 7 Cases from other juris-
dictions were cited to show that the language "withdrawn from
normal use because of breakdown" does not require an automo-
bile to be in a garage before it is considered withdrawn." The
cases indicated that three or four minutes of unsuccessful at-
tempts to start an automobile" or even to change tires in a dan-
gerous condition were considered sufficient to constitute a
"breakdown." 90
The insurer relied upon several court decisions which have
held that a substituted automobile was not within the policy
provision.9" The supreme court distinguished these cases by not-
ing that the uses of the substituted automobiles were for "the
insureds' desires for comfort or convenience and not because of
an inoperable or dangerous condition of the insured vehicle." 2
Generally, in cases involving the use of a substitute automo-
84. Id.
85. Id. at 622.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 623.
88. Lewis v. Bradley, 7 Wis. 2d 586, 97 N.W.2d 408 (1959).
89. Id.
90. Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. West, 351 P.2d 398 (Okla. 1959).
91. 201 S.E.2d at 623.
92. Id. On the appeal, the insurer also raised the issue that prompt notice of the
accident was not given in compliance with the policy's notice provision. The court held
that the evidence presented a question for the jury as to whether there was compliance.
The court cited Factory Mut. Ins. Co. of America v. Kennedy, 256 S.C. 376, 182 S.E.2d
727 (1971) for the rule that in an action upon an automobile liability contract in which
the rights of innocent third parties are affected, non-compliance with the notice provision
does not bar recovery unless the insurer shows that the lack of compliance has substan.
tially prejudiced its rights.
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bile when the insured automobile was "withdrawn from normal
use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruc-
tion" coverage has been afforded under the following construction
of the "substitute" provision:
93
(1) The phrase "withdrawn from normal use" requires the
described vehicle to be withdrawn from all normal use.
(2) The described vehicle must be withdrawn because of its
"breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction" and not for the
desire for comfort or convenience.
(3) The substitute automobile must not be owned by the
named insured.
(4) The use of the substitute vehicle must be a temporary
use.
(5) The automobile claimed to be covered under the provi-
sion must be actually used as a "substitute" for the described
vehicle.
(6) The owner of the substitute vehicle is not covered as an
insured under the substitute provision.
It is not clear whether the court considered all of these factors;
however, the result reached in Whittington appears consistent
with their proper application.
C. "Non-owned Vehicle" Coverage
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Nation-
wide Mutual Insurance Co.," State Farm sought a declaration by
summary judgment that automobile liability policies issued to
John S. Johnson and Nina Johnson as the named insureds did not
extend coverage to their daughter while driving a "non-owned"
automobile. The policies in question provided coverage for two
automobiles owned by Johnson and for one owned by his wife.
The daughter was involved in an accident while she was driving
a car not owned by her or her parents.
The district court held that the "use of non-owned automo-
biles" clause in the policies was so ambiguous as to be ineffectual.
In construing the lack of clarity against the insurer, the court
found the daughter to be within the protection of the policies.95
93. See generally Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 936 (1954).
94. 477 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1973).
95. 349 F. Supp. 158 (D.S.C. 1972). It is settled law that the South Carolina Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act does not require liability coverage for the daughter as a
"statutory insured" in her use of a non-owned automobile. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-
750.31(2), -750.32 (Cum. Supp. 1973). This point, decided in favor of voluntary contracts,
[Vol. 26
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The court of appeals vacated the district court ruling and re-
manded the case with directions to sustain the insurer's motion
for summary judgment. The court held that the provisions in the
liability policies extending coverage to the use of a non-owned
automobile by "any other person or organization not owning or
hiring such automobile, but only with respect to his or its liability
for the use of such automobile by an insured. . ." was not fatally
ambiguous, and the daughter was excluded from coverage.96 The
court construed the clause as affording coverage to a non-owner
for a liability that might arise from the use of the automobile by
the insured, in other words, a liability which is imputable to the
non-owner by reason of an act of the insured.97 In clarification the
court explained that if a non-owner is the employer or principal
of an insured, or would otherwise be liable for the insured's use
of an automobile, then the non-owner is protected under the
above provision.98 The court noted that this construction was the
one consistently placed upon this provision.99
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sessions,"' the South
Carolina Supreme Court examined insurance coverage of non-
owned vehicles. The main issue involved was whether a non-
owned pickup truck had been furnished to an employee for his
"regular use". The lower court found that the employer's vehicle,
being driven by the employee at the time of the accident, was not
furnished for his regular use. Thus, a provision in the employee's
insurance policy excluding coverage of "any automobile. . . fur-
nished for regular use to . . . the Named Insured ... " did not
apply.'
0 '
was settled by Crenshaw v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 259 S.C. 302, 191 S.E.2d 718
(1972), and Willis v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 253 S.C. 91, 169 S.E.2d 282 (1969). This liability
coverage issue should be distinguished from the uninsured motorist provision where the
statute does afford protection to resident relatives of the named insured's household. See
note 62 supra and accompanying text.
96. 477 F.2d at 541.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 541-42. In Beasley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 246 S.C. 153, 142 S.E.2d 872 (1965),
the court held that a non-owner clause extending coverage to "any other person . . .
legally responsible for use by such named insured . . . of an automobile" was clearly
unambiguous. 246 S.C. at 156, 142 S.E.2d at 873.
99. 477 F.2d at 542.
100. 260 S.C. 150, 194 S.E.2d 877 (1973).
101. Id. at 153, 194 S.E.2d at 879. This action was a declaratory judgment action
brought by Aetna as the insurer of the employer. Nationwide Insurance Company was the
carrier of the employee's personal vehicle and thus was joined as a party. Nationwide's
policy provided coverage to the employee while driving a non-owned automobile with the
consent of the owner.
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The employee's insurer appealed. The supreme court re-
versed, holding that the vehicle had been furnished to the em-
ployee for his regular use. Therefore, the exclusionary provision
in the policy applied, and the employee's insurer was not liable.
The court found that the vehicle was used solely in the employer's
pulpwood business each day by the employee, and that the em-
ployee was the regular driver and was the only employee licensed
to drive. Each day the employee used the truck to transport other
employees to and from work.
The court reasoned that the insurance policy covered a non-
owned automobile used casually or infrequently, but not one pro-
vided for the regular use of the named insured.' 2 An insured
should not be permitted to receive liability coverage for two regu-
larly used vehicles if only one has been described in the policy and
the premium has been determined accordingly.'"3
IV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Cancellation for Non-Payment
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Mackey,' °4 the
issue under consideration was whether the liability policy issued
to the insured under the assigned risk plan had been validly can-
celled for non-payment of premium prior to an accident involving
the insured's automobile. The trial court held in favor of the
insurance company. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the
decision and found sufficient evidence to establish a legitimate
cancellation of the policy because the insured had refused to pay
an additional surcharge on the premium. The surcharge had been
added to the original premium after the insurer received an offi-
cial motor vehicle report from the South Carolina Highway De-
partment. The report indicated that the insured's son, listed as
co-driver on the policy, had previously been convicted of driving
uninsured.'0
When the insurer billed the insured for the additional prem-
ium, a notice was included that the surcharge resulted from the
102. Id. at 155, 194 S.E.2d at 879.
103. Grantham v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 245 S.C. 144, 139 S.E.2d 744
(1964). In a case very nearly on point, Seaboard Fire & Marine Co. v. Gibbes, 392 F.2d
793 (4th Cir. 1968), the court reached the same result as in Aetna. See generally Annot.,
173 A.L.R. 901 (1948), 86 A.L.R.2d 937 (1962).
104. 260 S.C. 306, 195 S.E.2d 830 (1973).
105. Id. at 311, 195 S.E.2d at 832. It is customary procedure for automobile insurance
carriers to request motor vehicle reports of traffic violations by their policyholders.
[Vol. 26
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conviction of her son for driving uninsured. For approximately
two months following the issuance of the policy, the insurer corre-
sponded with the producer of record. The producer informed the
insurer of Ms. Mackey's contention of error on the part of the
highway department. She asserted that her estranged husband,
Robert Mackey, Sr., was the one actually convicted rather than
her son, Robert Mackey, Jr. The communications ended with the
insurer forwarding a copy of the motor vehicle report to the prod-
ucer stating, "If you can help us in clearing up this matter, please
advise."'' 6 The producer again advised Ms. Mackey of the re-
ported violation against her son. In response, she asserted that
she had a letter from the highway department indicating that her
son was not guilty of the alleged violation. Although the producer
requested that she promptly bring the letter to him to avoid can-
cellation, she failed to do so. At least several weeks passed before
the policy was cancelled in accordance with the statutorily re-
quired procedure.' 7
It appears that the real issue in this case was whether the
insurer was justified in relying upon the correctness of the official
motor vehicle report after being informed by the producer that
the son was not licensed to drive an automobile until more than
a year after the alleged traffic violation occurred. In essence, the
court was forced to determine whether the insurer had a duty of
more extensive investigation or whether Ms. Mackey had an af-
firmative duty to disprove the allegations."8 The supreme court
stated that the possession of the motor vehicle report by the in-
surer was prima facie evidence of its correctness.' 9 It further con-
cluded that it was reasonable for the insurer to have relied upon
the report in the absence of any contrary showing by the in-
sured."
B. Fraud
In Marlowe v. Reserve Life Insurance Co.,"' an insurer de-
106. Id. at 312, 195 S.E.2d at 832.
107. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.51, -138 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
108. The issue is one of fact, looking at all pertinent circumstances surrounding the
evidence. Ms. Mackey did produce a letter from the highway department clearing her son
of the violation, but the letter was produced and dated approximately two months after
she told the producer of record she had such a letter. Also, the automobile accident from
which this litigation arose did not occur until five months after the policy was cancelled.
Neither Ms. Mackey nor her son was driving the automobile at the time of the accident.
109. 260 S.C. at 314-15, 195 S.E.2d at 834.
110. Id. at 315, 195 S.E. 2d at 834.
111. 261 S.C. 23, 198 S.E.2d 267 (1973).
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fended an action to recover hospital expenses on the ground that
there were material misrepresentations in the application as to
the insured's medical history.' The supreme court held that
where the insurer's agent failed to accurately include on the in-
surance application the truthful information given him by the
insured, the insurer was estopped from denying coverage despite
a disclaimer of the agent's authority to waive the requirements
in the application.1
3
The insured, Helen S. Marlowe, sought hospital insurance
for herself and her children, but was informed by one agent that
this company would not insure her in view of her medical history.
The agent agreed to contact an agent of another company which
might provide coverage. John Rouse, an agent of Reserve Life,
subsequently contacted Ms. Marlowe and visited her home. It is
unquestioned that Ms. Marlowe told him she had been previously
refused coverage because her "medical record looks like a diction-
ary.""' Nevertheless, the agent filled out the application, which
Ms. Marlowe signed without reading. The court imputed the
knowledge of the agent to the insurer and stated:
The general rule is that the knowledge of an agent acquired
within the scope of his agency is imputable to his principal, and
if an insurance company, at the inception of the contract of
insurance has knowledge of facts which render the policy void
at its option, and the company delivers the policy as a valid
policy, it is estopped to assert such ground of forfeiture."15
112. The insurer conceded that truthful statements were given to its agent by the
applicant, and that there was no intent to defraud or deceive by the applicant. The
information was "incorrectly" included on the application by the agent. The insurer
argued that it could avoid liability because of a provision in the application which limited
the agent's authority as follows:
[t]hat the Company is not bound by any knowledge of or statement made
by or to any agent, unless set forth in this application, and no agent has author-
ity to waive the answer to any question on this application . . . or to bind the
Company in any way by making any promise or representation. . . . 261 S.C.
at 26, 198 S.E.2d at 269.
113. Id. at 30-31, 198 S.E.2d at 271. In Muckelvaney v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 261 S.C.
63, 198 S.E.2d 278 (1973), decided two weeks after Marlowe, the court was concerned with
the issue of whether the allegations of a complaint showed the existence of a contract of
insurance. The court held that the allegation that the insurer's soliciting agent told the
plaintiff that the new life insurance policy on her husband had been issued, when the
agent was in her home on another mission, was insufficient basis for estoppel. "It was a
voluntary remark, made. . . a few hours before the insured's untimely death, on which
there was no reliance . . . . Certainly, there is nothing . . . from which prejudice . . .
from this statement could possibly be inferred." 261 S.C. at 67, 198 S.E.2d at 280.
114. 261 S.C. at 25, 198 S.E.2d at 268. The facts presented were undisputed.
115. Id. at 27, 198 S.E.2d at 269. See also Fludd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc.,
(Vol. 26
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The insurer argued that the foregoing general rule was inapplica-
ble because the agent, in view of the limiting clause in the appli-
cation, had no authority to waive any of the insurer's rights. " ' But
the court stated that the general rule is followed in this state, and
that South Carolina also follows the rule that a provision limiting
an agent's power is subject to waiver by the insurance company
as are all provisions." 7 Since an insurance company must solicit
business through its agents, the agents may bind the company by
waiving such a provision in the application.
In accordance with the general rule, the court stated:
[W]here the fact is correctly stated by the applicant for insur-
ance but a false answer is written into the application by an
agent. . . without knowledge or collusion of the applicant, the
company is bound, and it makes no difference whether the agent
acted negligently or fraudulently, or whether the application
contained a covenant that the agent could not bind the com-
pany by making or receiving any representations or informa-
tion." 1
75 S.C. 315, 55 S.E. 762 (1906); Small v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 344, 128
S.E.2d 175 (1962).
116. 261 S.C. at 27, 198 S.E.2d at 269. Though Marlowe involved a question of an
agent's alleged limited authority to hold his principal vicariously liable, a 1973 federal
court case is worth mentioning for its dicta concerning a master's liability under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. In Garrett v. Jeffcoat, 483 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1973), a
passenger in an automobile owned and operated by a federal government employee alleged
a cause of action against the employee and the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The passenger had accepted an offer of settlement from the employee's
liability insurer and had executed a partial release to both the employee and his insurance
carrier. The court of appeals, in reversing the South Carolina District Court, held that
the plaintiff-passenger's release of the government employee's liability had no effect on
the liability of his employer, the United States Government. "ITihe United States
[was] solely liable for the negligent acts of its servants while operating motor vehicles
within the scope of their employment and that there is no cause of action whatever against
the employee himself . . . [Tihe liability of the Government is no longer derivative
. . . but is primary and exclusive." 483 F.2d at 593, citing the Federal Drivers Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2679(b)-(e).
The court had concluded that South Carolina law was not controlling. The district
court had relied upon South Carolina law that an employer's liability was vicarious to that
of an employee. Had South Carolina law controlled, a release of an employee would also
have released the master. The release would have been effective not merely upon the
theory that the master is denied his right of indemnity against the servant but also that,
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the sole basis of liability is the wrongdoing of
the servant imputed to the master. 483 F.2d at 592-93.
117. Cauthen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 189 S.C. 356, 1 S.E.2d 147 (1939); Able
v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 186 S.C. 26, 194 S.E. 628 (1938); Rearden v. State Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 79 S.C. 526, 60 S.E. 1106 (1908).
118. 261 S.C. at 28-29, 198 S.E.2d at 270. See also 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 595(5)
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The court concluded that the insurer must show that it relied
upon the misrepresentations of the insured [applicant] and not
upon mistakes or misrepresentations of its own [agent]." 9
THOMAS W. WEEKS
(1946), and 43 Am. Jun. 2d Insurance § 1106 (1969), for the general rule which was fol-
lowed by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
In Marlowe it was conceded that the insured had not intended to deceive or defraud
the insurer. In Winburn v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 201 S.E.2d 372 (S.C. 1973), this
question was on appeal to the supreme court. The insured had received a credit life
insurance policy from the insurer in connection with a loan at the Federal Land Bank of
Columbia. The court, recognizing that ordinarily a question of fraud in a case of this kind
was for a jury, concluded, however, that the case was one of those rare ones where a
directed verdict for the insurer should be allowed. The court agreed with the lower court
that the only reasonable conclusion from the facts was that the insured intended to deceive
and defraud the insurer when she deliberately suppressed the truth and gave false answers
as to her health and prior medical treatment.
It appears that the court had no alternative but to affirm the lower court because the
plaintiff had failed to establish his case on the record. The plaintiff had wanted to show
that the insured had not filled out the entire application, but had merely signed it, and
also that an agency relationship existed between the insurer and the Federal Land Bank.
Justice Bussey dissented and filed an opinion. He argued that the plaintiff's evidence
should have been introduced.
119. 261 S.C. at 28, 198 S.E.2d at 270.
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